Introduction
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and risk-sensitive foraging theory (McNamara & Houston, 1992; Real & Caraco, 1986; Stephens, 1981) are two influential accounts of decision making under risk, when the outcomes of decisions are variable.
Prospect theory (PT) was developed in the social sciences as a descriptive explanation of observed choices in humans, to accommodate consistent deviations from the rationality-based predictions of expected utility theory (EUT). Risk-sensitive foraging theory (RSFT) was developed by evolutionary behavioural ecologists as a normative explanation of how animals should choose between stochastic foraging options so as to maximise reproductive success.
Central to RSFT is the concept of reproductive value, which (for simple scenarios) can be defined as the expected future number of offspring produced by an individual over the remainder of its lifetime, as a function of its current state (Houston & McNamara, 1999) .
Since natural selection will tend to favour decisions that maximise reproductive value, this provides a common currency in which decisions can be compared (McNamara & Houston, 1986) .
A shared feature of PT and RSFT is that they both address how risk preferences depend on the decision maker's state (e.g. wealth or energy reserves). Because of this similarity, several researchers (Aktipis & Kurzban, 2004; Caraco & Lima, 1987; McDermott et al., 2008; Mishra, in press; Mishra & Fiddick, 2012; Mishra et al., 2012) have suggested that RFST may offer an evolutionary explanation for some of the choice patterns described by PT.
For example, McDermott et al. (2008) explicitly identified the reference state in PT with the amount of energy required to survive the night in RSFT, and used this to argue that PT preferences are in fact rational. Here we highlight a number of problems with this approach
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4 and show that it fails to account for the key features of PT. Because the relationship between state and reproductive value depends critically on the biological details of the situation under consideration (McNamara & Houston, 1992) , the patterns of choice predicted by RSFT do not, in general, match those described by PT. We closely examine the similarities and differences between PT and RSFT and discuss the extent to which the choices they predict are rational.
Prospect theory
The essential features of PT are captured by the value function in Fig. 1 , which shows the subjective value a decision maker assigns to gains and losses of varying magnitudes. The form of this function was chosen to reflect three key findings from empirical studies of human decision making that were not readily accounted for by EUT:
Reference point. The origin in Fig. 1 marks a ‗reference point' from which all gains and losses are assessed. Typically (though not always) this represents the decision maker's current state, and reflects the view that changes in state matter more to the decision maker than the final state (i.e. the state at which it ends up after making a decision). As Kahneman (2003a, p. 704) puts it, ‗the carriers of utility are gains and losses-changes of wealth rather than states of wealth'. This represents a form of path dependence, in that the response to a given state differs depending on the route taken (gain or loss) to reach that state.
Reflection effect. The value function is concave (i.e. decreasing in slope) for gains and convex (i.e. increasing in slope) for losses. This curvature implies (by Jensen's inequality; see
Box 1) that decision makers should be risk averse when choosing between alternative gains but risk prone when choosing between alternative losses, as found in some empirical studies (Kühberger, 1998; Levin et al., 1998; McNeil et al., 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) . For example, Tversky & Kahneman (1981) found that most people preferred a certain gain of $240 over a one-in-four chance of gaining $1000 (and gaining $0 otherwise), but preferred a one-in-four chance of losing $1000 (and losing $0 otherwise) over a certain loss of $750.
Loss aversion. The value function is sharply ‗kinked' about the origin (i.e. the slope changes abruptly, such that the function is not differentiable at this point) and is steeper for losses than gains, so that a loss of a given magnitude has a stronger effect on value than a gain of the same magnitude. This reflects the finding in some studies that people care more about losses than gains of equivalent magnitude (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991 . For example, Tversky & Kahneman (1992) found that participants would only accept an even chance of winning or losing money when the amount to be won was at least twice the amount to be lost. The general notion of loss aversion was famously captured by two professional tennis players, Jimmy Connors (-I hate to lose more than I love to win‖; Aktipis & Kurzban, 2004, p. 142 ) and Andre Agassi (-A win doesn't feel as good as a loss feels bad‖; Agassi, 2009, p. 167) . Caraco, 1986) . The particular risk-sensitive foraging model that has been linked to PT is the daily energy budget rule (Stephens, 1981) . This rule was developed to explain the behaviour of small birds foraging in winter, which need to obtain enough energy during the day to enable them to survive the night (when they cannot feed). Building on the work of Caraco (1980) , Stephens (1981) Stephens's analysis to allow the forager to make repeated (i.e. dynamic) choices between the two options and showed that the rule still holds. It also holds if starvation during the foraging period is possible (Houston & McNamara, 1985) , except at low reserve levels. Empirical work by Caraco et al. (1980 Caraco et al. ( , 1990 supported the predictions of the daily energy budget rule, but subsequent tests have yielded mixed results (Kacelnik & El Mouden, 2013) .
Connections between risk-sensitive foraging theory and prospect theory
Several researchers have noted a possible link between the patterns described by PT and the evolutionary predictions of RSFT (Aktipis & Kurzban, 2004; Caraco & Lima, 1987; McDermott et al., 2008; Mishra, in press; Mishra & Fiddick, 2012; Mishra et al., 2012) . For example, Aktipis & Kurzban (2004) argued that the fact that the value function is concave for gains makes sense from an evolutionary perspective, because energetic gains will result in diminishing fitness returns-a given increase in energy matters much more to an animal that is close to starvation than to one that is well fed. They also argued that losses of energy have a bigger impact on fitness than equivalent gains, because losses can sometimes lead to death (and hence zero future reproductive success) whereas gains merely extend the lifespan. In a similar vein, Mishra (in press) asserted that ‗In fitness terms, marginal losses are much more significant than marginal gains of a similar magnitude; the prospect of not reproducing at all is substantially worse than increasing fitness slightly'. If such claims are valid, these factors could conceivably result in an optimal forager that is loss averse, risk averse when well fed and risk prone when close to starvation. risk-averse behaviour is optimal in the ‗domain of gains', where it expects to exceed x c . This strategy maximises the chance of surviving to the next day in an environment where the amount of food obtained before nightfall is drawn from a stable probability distribution (e.g. While superficially appealing, on closer inspection these connections turn out to be problematic. There are two related issues: first, whether the function relating reproductive value to energetic gains is likely to have the form assumed by McDermott et al. (2008) ; and second, whether the reference state in PT corresponds to the critical level x c in RSFT. We discuss both of these issues below.
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What is the shape of the reproductive value function?
Following Stephens's (1981) daily energy budget model, McDermott et al. (2008) considered the goal of surviving a single day. They showed that under the assumptions of their model, the probability of survival-which they equated with fitness-is a symmetrical sigmoid function of the expected (i.e. mean) energy gain (Fig. 2) . However, this particular function is only valid for a very restricted set of circumstances, namely: when the forager has no choice between foraging options; when there is no benefit of excess reserves above the critical threshold; and when there are no upper or lower boundaries on reserves. Below we examine each of these assumptions in turn.
No choice. In McDermott et al.'s model, the forager has no behavioural choices to make; the amount of food it gains before nightfall is a random draw from a stable probability distribution. This is equivalent to assuming that, after a one-off choice between alternative
options, the forager is constrained to follow some background strategy (McNamara & Houston, 1987) . In contrast, Stephens (1981) assumed that, after choosing between a highvariance and a low-variance option, the forager would continue exploiting that food source for the rest of the day. This leads to a reproductive value function that is not symmetrical, but kinked at the critical value of reserves (Fig. 3, thick grey line) . If, instead, the forager can switch dynamically between high-and low-variance options, reproductive value is greater than under either static option and the function is less kinked, but still asymmetric (Fig. 3, solid black line; Houston & McNamara, 1982) . To derive the appropriate form of this function, it is necessary to specify how foraging decisions affect the animal's future survival and reproduction (Houston & McNamara, 1999) .
One clear advantage of this approach is that it reveals how the value of the animal's life affects its willingness to take risks. Aktipis & Kurzban (2004) , McDermott et al. (2008) and Mishra (in press) all claimed that animals should be loss averse because energetic losses can lead to death and are therefore more important for fitness than energy gains, but this claim is unjustified because they did not consider how the value of the animal's life depends on its future expectations. This is something that is explicitly taken into account when deriving the
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
11 relationship between reproductive value and energy reserves (Houston & McNamara, 1999 Fig. 2 ) and therefore predicts equal sensitivity to gains and losses at this point. At the same critical level, Stephens's (1981) model predicts differential sensitivity to gains and losses due to a kink in the function (Fig. 3 , thick grey line), but the pattern is opposite to that described by prospect theory (cf. Fig. 1 ): the loss of a fixed amount of reserves implies a smaller change in reproductive value than a gain of the same amount. So a simple application of the daily energy budget rule cannot account for this key feature of PT. The same is true for dynamic choices (Fig. 3 , solid black line).
Where is the reference point?
In However, the gains and losses in PT represent changes in state, rather than final outcomes such as exceeding or falling short of a critical energy level at nightfall (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 277) . Kahneman (2003a) illustrated the importance of changes rather than end states by comparing the attitudes of two people, one whose wealth has decreased
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12 from 4 million to 3 million and the other whose wealth has increased from 1 million to 1.1 million. The second person typically feels happier with their financial report, which is something that McDermott et al.'s model, by focusing on end states, cannot explain.
Stephens's (1981) daily energy budget rule is clearly not reference-dependent in the sense used by the architects of PT (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) .
In principle, an optimal individual would be risk averse for gains and risk prone for 
Is prospect theory rational?
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RSFT, like EUT, offers a rational account of behaviour (Table 1) , although the two theories invoke different concepts of rationality. EUT assumes that agents seek to maximise utility (i.e. the satisfaction they derive from decision outcomes) and in this sense are economically rational (Bateson, 2010; Houston et al., 2007; Kacelnik, 2006) . Utility is not directly measurable and is instead inferred, post facto, from observed choices (for a discussion of the problems this approach entails, see Kacelnik, 2006 and Houston et al., 2007) . In contrast, RSFT is founded on the concept of biological rationality, according to which individuals have evolved to maximise their inclusive fitness (Bateson, 2010; Houston et al., 2007; Kacelnik, 2006) . Differently from utility, fitness can be measured independently of the decisions made, in the currency of reproductive value (Houston et al., 2007) . In Stephens's (1981) Unlike EUT and RSFT, PT does not offer a rational account of behaviour (Table 1 ).
The value function in PT is inferred from empirically observed choices, redefining the utility function of EUT relative to a reference state in a way that can accommodate deviations from economically rational behaviour. Despite their claims, current attempts to explain this value function from an evolutionary perspective fail to offer a rational justification for the reference state. The effects generated by the reference state are not logical in any of the models proposed; indeed, they appear to be irrational (Kahneman, 2003a,b) . An economically rational decision maker should be concerned with final outcomes, rather than gains and losses from an earlier state.
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Concluding remarks
RSFT provides a predictive framework for when individuals should switch between risk-prone and risk-averse behaviour (Houston & McNamara, 1999; McNamara & Houston, 1992) . This framework may yet prove to offer useful insights into the evolutionary origins of PT preferences (Caraco & Lima, 1987) and we encourage further research along these lines. dynamically between the two options (solid black line). The sudden change in slope just before x = 500 indicates a ‗kink' in the reproductive value function as the forager switches from the high-variance option to the low-variance option; but note that this is an abrupt increase in slope rather than the abrupt decrease shown in the prospect theory curve (Fig. 1) .
Parameter values: x c = 500; mean net energy gain per time step = 0 (both options), variance = 3.125 (high-variance option) or 1.25 (low-variance option); 60 time steps remaining until nightfall. appropriate function for reproductive value is found by maximising survival over several days, using dynamic programming (Clark & Mangel, 2000; Houston & McNamara, 1999; McNamara & Houston, 1986) . The equivalent function for surviving a single day is shown
